The grain trade agreement between Russia, Ukraine, the UN and Turkey, known more commonly as the Black Sea Grain Initiative, is a prime example of this. From the time of its signing on July 22, 2022, until its expiration on July 18, 2023, approximately 33 million tonnes of grain were exported from Ukrainian ports amidst a bloody conflict between the two nations – decreasing global food prices by 20% and averting widespread famine in some low-income countries. This remarkable diplomatic achievement was made possible through the meeting of parties with entirely different motives and objectives under the roof of Turkey, the sole neutral member state within the NATO alliance.
However, as is well known, Russia has been refusing to extend the agreement since midsummer 2023 and most recently at the talks in Sochi. This was not unexpected, given their prior statements indicating their intention to terminate the deal unless Western countries fulfill their obligations under the agreement, which entail the lifting of sanctions on the Russian Agricultural Bank and its reintegration into the SWIFT system. As things stand, Ukraine is sending some of its grain through a coastal sea route which goes through the western coastline of the Black Sea, specifically passing through the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria, as a precautionary measure to avoid a possible Russian attack. A smaller portion of the grain is also transported by rail to European countries. Both of the current methods are costly, time-consuming, and involve numerous logistical challenges, highlighting the reality that Ukraine cannot effectively export goods unless Russia allows it.
Given the current circumstances, the resumption of the grain deal is contingent upon effective negotiations among several nations and, above all else, on Russia's willingness to be persuaded. Russia demonstrates a keen understanding of the geopolitical advantages it possesses in the status quo, thus adopting a deliberate strategy to assess the extent to which the Western powers are willing to make concessions. A similar approach was also evident when Russia refused to renew the grain agreement on two separate occasions thereby acquiring further leverage in the process. While it is indeed true that UN authorities have not fulfilled their commitment to ensure the shipment of Russian foodstuffs and fertilizers to Western markets, the UN argues that Russian food exports and fertilizers are not subjected to sanctions in the first place. Nevertheless, the present limitations on payments, logistics, and insurance have amounted to a significant barrier to the transportation of Russian goods, hence reinforcing the need for Russia to reintegrate into certain Western institutions and systems. In Russia, there are also concerns pertaining to the security implications associated with the resumption of the corridor, as well as its potential to be exploited as a means of launching attacks against Russia. The Ukrainian drone attacks on naval bases and assaults on the Kerch Bridge, which serves as a vital link between Crimea and the Russian mainland, have undoubtedly played a role in Russia’s reluctance to resume the deal.
Several nations, notably China and African countries, have also expressed significant interest in the result of the ongoing negotiation. During the time that the Grain Deal was in effect, China was the country that bought the most grain from Ukraine. They have bought almost 8 million tons of it which is equivalent to nearly 25% of Ukraine’s total grain export. Despite this, however, and to the surprise of many, China remained mostly silent when Russia refused to extend the agreement and later on withdrew entirely from it. One explanation could be that China stands to gain a great deal from Russia's prolonged isolation from the West, including easier access to Russian markets and lower prices on Russian products. China may also buy all the required grain from Russia and Brazil, potentially at a cheaper rate than they would from Ukraine. The Chinese position on Russia's decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain initiative is primarily driven by geopolitical considerations, despite its own interests in the initiative. By considering and advocating for the lifting of barriers on Russian agricultural exports as a necessary requirement for renewal, there is implied support for Russia's current stance. The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, however, also acknowledged the potential for more unrest in the Global South due to rising food prices should Russia not rejoin the initiative. Overall, China seems to be prioritizing its partnerships with Russia, despite its recent efforts to further build relations with the Global South. Therefore, it seems unlikely that Beijing is going to use its influence over Moscow for the continuation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
One of Russia's primary criticisms has been that contrary to what was promised, the majority of Ukraine's grain exports under the initiative went to industrialized/European nations rather than developing/African ones. The United Nations has responded to this critique by asserting that African nations have nevertheless benefited from the increased supply, as it has resulted in a decrease in food prices, hence making food more affordable for the masses. Meanwhile, Russia had begun implementing its own initiative to provide specific African nations with essential foodstuffs. During the meeting held in Sochi, President Putin addressed the prospect of facilitating the processing of Russian grain in Turkey, and having it distributed to the Global South from there. However, there are concerns as to whether this would be sufficient for all the countries in need (the new plan is limited to only a few African nations). For this reason, a number of African leaders have urged Putin to bring the Black Sea Grain Initiative back on track. The uncertainty remains regarding Russia's potential decision to exclusively and unilaterally pursue its own grain initiative for supplying African countries, while simultaneously restricting Ukrainian shipments. Like China, numerous African nations seek the inclusion of Russian shipments in the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which calls for certain concessions from Western countries.
In light of the mere subtle pressures displayed by Africa and China, it appears that Turkey stands as the only country with the potential to effectively convince Russia to participate once again in the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Indeed, the success of the past negotiations can be attributed, in part, to the close ties between Erdogan and Putin. Turkey also has a significant stake in the restoration of the agreement. The potential success in convincing Russia to rejoin the deal would enhance Ankara's diplomatic position, particularly in dealings with Western nations. Both Turkey and Russia are attempting to secure some concessions from the West while at the same time having a crucial position in the ongoing affairs of Western nations. Meanwhile, the West is still facing some pressure from the Global South due to concerns regarding the prospects of the agreement's permanent cessation on food security and the potential implications of not meeting Russia's demands on their image among developing nations. Considering the current circumstances, in the very near future, there may be a chance for Russia to force a significant concession from the West to ensure the continuation of the Black Sea Grain Initiative.